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States have the legal responsibility and authority to provide public
education for their citizens. How each state fulfills its responsibility varies. Whether state education agencies (SEAs) are supporting
school reform efforts, providing technical assistance, defining and
controlling educational content, or assessing the outcomes of education, it is generally agreed that SEAs are there to assure that districts and schools are providing quality opportunities to children,
and in a manner that meets the standards the state has set for
achievement. With that in mind, this article addresses some of the
specific ways SEAs set out to accomplish these goals. Having
worked with dozens of CSR implementing schools and CSR implementation staff at several SEAs, Edmund T. Hamann and Brett
Lane detail the initiation and early management of the federal CSR
program by the Maine and Puerto Rico Departments of Education.
Both Hamann and Lane are research and evaluation specialists at
the Education Alliance at Brown University.

Introduction
About NCCSR — A partnership of The George
Washington University, the Council for Basic
Education, and the Institute for Educational
Leadership
The National Clearinghouse for Comprehensive
School Reform collects and disseminates information
that builds the capacity of schools to raise the academic achievement of all students. Through its web site,
reference and retrieval services, and publications,
NCCSR is the central gateway to information on CSR.
If you have documents on CSR that should be added
to our database, please contact us for submission information.

The roles of state education agencies (SEAs) in relation to comprehensive school reform (CSR) are multiple, under-scrutinized, and
* The research described here is based upon work supported by the Office of
Educational Research and Improvement (OERI), U.S. Department of Education,
under contract number RJ96006401 and by the Institute of Education Sciences
(IES), U.S. Department of Education, under Contract Number ED-01-CO-0010.
Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this
material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of IES,
the U.S. Department of Education, or any other agency of the U.S. Government.
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perhaps even contradictory—as promoter, manager,
initiator, intermediary, fiduciary agent, and more.
Yet we know that both through the federal ObeyPorter Comprehensive School Reform (CSR) program and through other mechanisms (e.g., New
Jersey’s Abbott v. Burke litigation) that SEAs have
substantive roles in how “the third wave of reform”
(Desimone, 2002, p. 434)—the comprehensive
school reform movement—plays out. This movement, which is both more popular and more criticized than ever before (Berends, et al., 2001; Sack,
2002; Viadero, 2001), asserts that whole schools
should be units of change and that school change
plans should articulate how all students and staff are
to be targets of and participants in the multiple integrated steps for improvement. Keeping SEAs’ multiple roles in mind, we need to explicitly examine
SEA involvement with CSR so we are positioned to
know if/how SEA activities affect school-level
implementation of CSR.
There is a welcome and growing literature about
how educational policies are interpreted and
changed at the school level (e.g., Coburn, 2001;
Cuban, 1998; Hill, 2001; Irvine & Larson, 2001;
Young, 1999) or even district level (Spillane, 1998),
but we have not found corresponding research
focusing at the SEA level, with the important exception of two books about or partially about Kentucky
(Lusi, 1997; Whitford & Jones [Eds.] 2000). Yet
research by Datnow and colleagues (Datnow, et al.
2002; Datnow & Stringfield, 2000; Yonezawa &
Datnow, 1999) shows irrefutably that the fate of
CSR implementation in terms of both sustainability
and impact is directly tied to the alignment of CSR
models with district and state policy. It follows that
SEA efforts that impede or promote alignment matter when it comes to the viability and sustainability
of CSR.
The text that follows looks most closely at the initiation and early management of the federal CSR pro-
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gram by the Maine and Puerto Rico Departments of
Education (MEDOE and PRDOE), which we have
studied ethnographically in some detail (Hamann, et
al. 2001; Hamann & Lane, 2002; in press). It is also
informed by our applied research and technical
assistance with the CSR programs in Connecticut,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York,
Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington.
Three rationales have led us to look particularly
closely at the examples of Maine and Puerto Rico—
expediency, illustrative potential, and generalizability. Since 1999, under the rubric of the federal
Northeast and Islands Regional Educational
Laboratory contract, we have been applied
researchers studying and supporting the implementation of Obey-Porter in New York, Puerto Rico, and
all six New England states. From the expediently
assembled group of eight cases we knew well, we
selected Maine and Puerto Rico because both stand
out as SEAs that have made a number of customizations of the original federal Obey-Porter CSR template. Consistent with Stake’s (1995) description of
an instrumental case study, both cases here were
selected for the way they could illustrate an issue:
adaptation of CSR policy at the SEA level. By
selecting Maine and Puerto Rico we selected two
jurisdictions that are very distinct from each other,
differing linguistically and culturally and in their
educational histories and reliance on federal
resources for school support. Thus, juxtaposing
Maine and Puerto Rico matches the logic of what
Patton (1990, p. 172) calls “maximum variation
sampling.” If commonalities emerge from analysis
of these explicitly different cases, then such commonalities are likely to pertain elsewhere. Those
interested in a further explanation of our methodology are directed to Hamann and Lane (in press).

The Case of Maine
For Maine, like for several small states nearby (e.g.,
New Hampshire and Vermont), there were preliminary reasons to be skeptical of Obey-Porter when it

was first being promoted in 1998. Given that implementation had certain fixed costs for SEAs—e.g.,
drafting an implementation plan for the U.S.
Department of Education, drafting a request for proposal (RFP) for schools, soliciting and then reviewing schools’ applications, and then overseeing
implementation—the modest amount of available
funds for MEDOE (5% of the total allocation, i.e.,
less than $30,000) and for schools ($565,500 to be
divided 11 ways) was not necessarily worth the
effort. Yet Maine embraced the program after making two key adaptations to federal policy—(1)
restricting its grant awards to high schools and (2)
attaching its award process to the state-drafted
Promising Futures initiative. As a further adaptation
the newly created Center for Inquiry in Secondary
Education (CISE), an atypically autonomous small
program within MEDOE, was then appointed to
manage the program, rather than the Title I office.
CISE employed key personnel, who both reconciled
CSR with other state policies and cultivated personalized trusting relationships with school-based
implementers that made CISE personnel facilitators
in the school-level implementation process. This
also set up the culturally welcome prospect of the
lateral exchange of procedural knowledge whereby
practitioners at different schools helped each other
with implementation.
Adaptation using Promising Futures
Just as the federal government was rolling out ObeyPorter, an ad hoc committee assembled by MEDOE
was publishing Promising Futures (Maine
Commission on Secondary Education, 1998), a new
framework for improving high schooling within the
state. Promising Futures had been drafted at the
impetus of Maine’s commissioner who was troubled
by the state’s comparative record on the NAEP—
Maine was well ahead of average at the elementary
level, somewhat ahead at the middle school level,
but only middle of the pack in high school.
Promising Futures was crafted by a team of more

than 20 Maine educators (based in high schools, district offices, institutes of higher education, and at
MEDOE) and recommended implementation of six
core principles and fifteen core practices. When it
was released, it was announced as an invitation for
change. However, with the important exception of
charging CISE with promoting it, few resources
were available to support its implementation.
It was in this context that MEDOE realized that federal CSR funds might be used as carrots to encourage Maine high schools’ embrace of Promising
Futures. In 1998, MEDOE administrators successfully requested federal waivers to restrict Maine’s
CSR competition to high schools, to attach parts of
Promising Futures to the request-for-proposals distributed to schools, and to deemphasize Title I status
(but not need) as a criterion for making awards
because very few Maine high schools were Title I
schools. Once the waivers were granted, CSR was
no longer just a small new federal program with a lot
of procedural details; instead, it was a means to realize a locally articulated high school reform agenda
around which there had been much recent mobilization.
With CSR formally linked to Promising Futures, it
was easily argued (within MEDOE) that the newly
created CISE should coordinate CSR implementation. The link to CISE meant that these SEA-based
educators could contribute as a team to the coordination of CSR implementation, even if only one CISE
staff person was formally designated as CSR
Coordinator and supported by federal CSR funds.
As a CISE-based educator observed to us in May
2002, “If we had to revert to relying on the 5%
[SEA-level CSR] allocation, we’d only be doing
compliance and checklist activities, no leading.”
Instead, the state’s investment in CISE meant CSR
was coordinated by a team, with the ratio of SEAstaff to implementing schools as low as 1:4.
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This low ratio mattered for several reasons, notably
the way it allowed MEDOE personnel to frequently
visit and interact with personnel at CSR schools
where they shared strategies and cultivated sufficiently personal trusting relationships that some
awkward state-level policy requirements could be
successfully negotiated. For example, pursuant to
Maine law requiring a highly detailed annual “Rider
A” contract for allocations of more than $25,000,
each CSR school each year has had to complete a
Rider A, a document that doubled as a work plan and
grant proposal update. The CSR coordinator and
other CISE staff used the Rider A requirement to
position themselves sympathetically with school
staff. Instead of being the ‘heavies’ demanding
compliance with Promising Futures, they were able
to represent themselves as advocates and assistants
who could help with a burdensome bureaucratic procedure (i.e., Rider A) that they could not change.
Benefits of Adaptation
Maine’s departure from the federal blueprint by
linking CSR, Promising Futures, and CISE created
an exploitable similarity between all of Maine’s
CSR schools and an impetus for the lateral exchange
of information regarding best practices. There were
two common routes for this lateral exchange
between Maine CSR schools—exchange through
intermediaries like CISE staff and direct exchange
between educators from different schools either at
regional professional development activities or
through direct visits to each others’ schools. CISE
staff created formal and de facto policies that
enabled both. Formally, they arranged several meetings annually for CSR schools (including those that
had finished their three years of funding), scheduled
day-long visits to CSR schools, and gathered
detailed written renderings about implementing
schools’ experiences. These efforts permitted CISE
staff to learn much about the particular struggles and
successes of given schools and to use such learning
to enhance their procedural knowledge about high
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school improvement which they could subsequently
share. As of 2004, the implementation of Promising
Futures by way of CSR funding has been undertaken by 33 of Maine’s 140 public high schools. This
effort has also drawn national interest. In 2003, the
Gates Foundation contributed $10 million to
Maine’s Mitchell Institute to support additional high
schools’ implementation of Promising Futures.
Despite the implementation’s momentum, as of
2004 the record of improved student outcomes at
Promising Futures schools on the Maine Education
Assessment (MEA) was inconsistent. Perhaps, as
policy implementation scholar Milbrey McLaughlin
(1987) would suggest, it was too early to look at this
kind of measure. In 2002 an educator at one of the
first CSR/Promising Futures high schools explained
that appropriate measurement of his school’s successes or struggles could only begin with the Class
of 2004 as that class was the first at his school to
experience changed practices in each of their years
at high school. By that standard and excluding a
tiny rural school whose sample size of test takers is
too small for meaningful year-to-year comparison,
of Maine’s other 10 first Promising Futures/CSR
schools, 9 showed improvement in writing as measured by percentage of students meeting or exceeding
the standard in that topic. Seven showed improvement in science (and one matched its baseline
score). But only three improved in math and only
one improved in reading (while one matched its
baseline). Each of these schools had begun implementation in 1999-2000 and all but two had changed
principals at least once since then.

The Case of Puerto Rico
Three key adaptations marked PRDOE’s response to
CSR in 1998: (1) the insistence on finding islandoriginating school reform models that could be
available to CSR-funded schools, (2) the solicitation
and screening of the 17 comprehensive school
reform models named in the Obey-Porter legislation

to see if they should be made available to Puerto
CSR applicant schools, and (3) the welcoming of
decidedly non-comprehensive models that responded to the educational priorities of Puerto Rico’s
Secretary of Education and that could be incorporated into a school’s Title I Schoolwide plan. The first
two of these were incorporated into PRDOE’s
response to CSR from the very beginning. The
third, which ultimately supported broad implementation of Lightspan, Computer Curriculum
Consultants, and even the Puerto Rico Science
Systemic Initiative (PRSSI) as CSR models, came
later, after PRDOE’s first plan for CSR implementation had been turned down by the U.S. Department
of Education.
Adaptation using Five Reform Models
When PRDOE officials first began planning for
CSR implementation in the winter of 1998, they had
already determined to identify at least one islanddeveloped, research-grounded, whole-school reform
model that could be included on the list of externally developed CSR models that those applying for
CSR funds could promise to implement. It was
unclear to us where this insistence came from.
Perhaps it represented a familiarity with recent
research (e.g., Stringfield et al. 1998) that noted that
none of the popular CSR models at that time had
been designed for and tested on Spanish-speaking
students (which practically all Puerto Rican students
are). Under this rationale a model of proven effectiveness on the island would be preferable. Perhaps
it reflected Puerto Rico’s historic ambivalence
toward mainland originating educational policies
and programs (Epstein, 1970; Nieto 2000). Puerto
Rico is atypically reliant on federal support for its K12 educational program—in 1998-99, 27.7% of K12 education spending in Puerto Rico was federal,
almost four times more than the national average of
7.1% (Johnson, 2001)—but also has been cautious
regarding how much mainland culture it wants to
import. In this light, even one island-originating
option would mean CSR would not as readily by

viewed as an imposition from the mainland. In its
successful CSR implementation plan submitted to
the U.S. Department of Education in late 1998,
PRDOE named one island-developed model on its
short list of approved CSR models. That fifteen of
Puerto Rico’s first seventy-five CSR schools opted
for that model—the Puerto Rico State Systemic
Initiative (PRSSI)—suggests the wisdom of
PRDOE’s strategy. Island-developed models were
an option many schools wanted.
PRDOE was not only trying to promote/allow
island-developed models, however. In February
1998, a telephone poll of 16 of the 17 providers
named in the Obey-Porter legislation indicated that
just six were interested/willing to operate in Puerto
Rico. Others claimed that the high costs of operating in Puerto Rico (which requires expensive plane
tickets for mainland-based providers) and/or their
lack of materials in Spanish and lack of Spanishspeaking professional developers kept them from
being interested at the time. Four of those six models chose to present at an April 1998 model fair for
potential CSR schools and three of the four were
later named on the menu of model choices developed for CSR applicant schools by PRDOE and
approved by the U.S. Department of Education.
PRDOE’s initial response to CSR had been, in concurrence with federal guidance, to try to identify
externally-developed whole school change models.
Later in 1998, PRDOE began to consider models
that were not comprehensive on their own, but that
could be incorporated into existing comprehensive
plans, like a Title I Schoolwide plan. As in Maine,
this led to an explicit alignment of CSR strategies
and SEA-approved reform plans. In 1998, Puerto
Rico’s Secretary of Education had disseminated an
island-wide reform strategy that, among other
things, emphasized technology education and
improvement in English instruction to support the
goal of graduating “bilingual citizens.” The fifth (of
five) models on the menu that PRDOE requested
Benchmark Page 5

applicant schools to select from was Lightspan.
Lightspan was not one of the 17 models named in
the original Obey-Porter legislation, but it did later
appear in the Catalog of School Reform Models,
produced jointly by the National Clearinghouse for
Comprehensive School Reform (NCCSR) and the
Northwest Regional Educational Laboratory
(NWREL), in the sub-category Reading/Language
Arts (from which it was more recently removed).
Lightspan responded overtly to several of the
PRDOE Secretary’s goals to promote English acquisition and the integration of technology.
In 1999, when the first round of 75 CSRD schools
was selected in Puerto Rico, 49 opted for Lightspan.
Eight opted for another technologically oriented
model developed by Computer Curriculum
Consultants (which had not been mentioned in the
accepted plan). Fifteen selected PRSSI (which has a
math and science emphasis), and three opted for
Expeditionary Learning/ Outward Bound. Roots
and Wings and Accelerated Schools, though named
as choices in PRDOE’s U.S. Department of
Education-approved implementation plan, were not
selected by any schools.
Puerto Rico’s response to CSR is related to its educational history. One needs to look back to the
1940s to find major changes in Puerto Rican K-12
schooling policy. However, in the last decade of the
century, substantial reform laws were passed three
times: in 1990, 1993, and 1999. The 1993 reform
(based on La Ley Orgánico 18 del 1993) required
decentralization of school administration. Almost
immediately thereafter, the 1994 ESEA, the
Improving America’s Schools Act, meant that many
of Puerto Rico’s schools were eligible to become
“Title I Schoolwide.” Because of Title I requirements, Puerto Rico’s principals gained site-based
management responsibilities, and were also asked to
organize and be responsible for whole-school
reform.
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Benefits of Adaptation
CSR became a tool to support the reconciliation of
Puerto Rico’s own 1993 educational restructuring
and the 1994 ESEA. The 1993 change in Puerto
Rican education law came with few new resources
for professional development or other means to
assist the transition to a new form of school governance, and it offered little to help schools with the
task of aligning their work with Puerto Rico’s newly
articulated education standards. Thus, when CSR
applications were first solicited in Puerto Rico in
1998, the $50,000+ per year made available was
welcome at schools that lacked many other obvious
means for obtaining additional resources. CSR
meant there were chances to accelerate the enactment of already drafted school improvement plans,
to plug gaps in existing implementation, and to continue the work of aligning with standards and islandwide educational priorities. CSR was not a major
stimulus for whole-school change, but nor did it
need to be. Instead, in locally responsive ways, it
became a vehicle to further realize plans already
underway.

The Real World of SEA Practice:
Implications for Scale-up,
Sustainability, and Effectiveness
Four contextual points about SEA implementation
of CSR emerge from the cases just reviewed. First,
as McLaughlin (1987) and Levinson and Sutton
(2001) would predict, when SEA staff act as education policy intermediaries (i.e., between federal policy and local practice), they also act as policy
adapters and thereby become co-authors of the ultimate policy that becomes practice. Indeed, SEA personnel can so substantially adapt a federal policy
that, in cases like those sketched here—with Maine
using CSR to support the creation of a network of
Promising Futures high schools and Puerto Rico
using CSR mostly to support the implementation of

curriculum reform priorities and island-originating
reforms—SEA personnel as “policy co-initiators”
may be an aptly descriptive label.
Second, it seems clear that even when SEAs take on
policy intermediary roles, they retain a great amount
of policy shaping power. Though Maine had to
request a waiver for its chosen CSR policy and
though Puerto Rico had to submit its CSR plan a
second time in 1998 before getting federal approval,
in both cases CSR as implemented showed a substantial SEA imprint.
Third, we should note that when SEA-based educators were faced with an externally initiated policy,
they reconciled that new policy with existing salient
policies and they understood the new policy through
the lenses of the policies with which they are already
involved. Thus, Maine’s Rider A requirement and
Puerto Rico’s Ley Orgánico 18 del 1993 were both
relevant to implementation in the respective jurisdictions and became part of the reconciled CSR policy as practiced in each place. Commissioners’ priorities for high school reform or further incorporation of English and technology use became pieces of
CSR. These adaptations do not mean that the premises of federal policy were rejected, but rather that
much of the policy as implemented was not of federal origin.
Fourth, it seems SEA-level policy adaptation is
inevitable and consistent with constructivist theories
of learning (Datnow, et al., 2002). Real people with
real professional and personal experiences attended
meetings and read federal CSR guidance to try to
figure out what they were supposed to do. But these
same individuals were not blank slates, they endeavored to understand CSR in relation to other problem
diagnoses and strategies that were part of both their
formal job descriptions and their senses of what
should be. When state-drafted priorities were inserted, CSR policy within that state became endowed
with the problem diagnoses and strategies that were

already salient to SEA officials. In Maine, when
CSR became the vehicle for systemic promotion of
Promising Futures, it became something different
than the Obey-Porter originators had envisioned. To
the Maine educators, CSR took on more familiar
dimensions and was easier to subscribe to.
Similarly, in Puerto Rico where the idea that CSRD
would initiate comprehensive reform was viewed
unenthusiastically (as evidenced by the low number
of schools that opted for whole-school reform models as compared to models that offered more targeted assistance), the adapted idea that CSR could support the consolidation and continuation of change
processes initiated by the 1993 Ley Organico 18, the
1994 ESEA, and the PRDOE secretary’s articulation
of various priorities, made CSR welcome.

Conclusion
Ultimately, sustainability, scaling-up, and effectiveness are three of the most pressing challenges for
CSR (Datnow, et al, 2002; Coburn, 2003; Fink,
2000), but the case studies we have presented were
not designed to measure how much MEDOE and
PRDOE activities related to CSR affected these
dimensions. Rather our goal was to use ethnographic methods to tackle an antecedent step, to illustrate
how SEAs change CSR as they mediate between the
levels of federal policy and school-level implementation. Still, we think our research frames some
hypotheses about sustainability, scaling-up, and
effectiveness that other research efforts could test.
Coburn (2003) notes how important implementer
buy-in to new strategies and practices is to both
quality and endurance of their implementation.
Both Maine and Puerto Rico’s alignment of CSR
with locally relevant problem diagnoses made their
CSR policies more responsive to needs that locally
were deemed salient and made them part of longerterm change processes. Maine’s CSR high schools,
like all CSR schools, may only have received three
years of Obey-Porter funding but MEDOE’s
Benchmark Page 7

embrace of Promising Futures still pertains in the
years following the end of funding. Similarly,
Puerto Rico’s CSR schools may only have received
three years of funding, but funding that was a catalyst in the much longer quests (1) to enact the plans
articulated in their Title I Schoolwide/site-based
management plans and (2) to respond to the priorities of promoting bilingualism and technological literacy.
Regarding effectiveness, as Lusi notes, SEAs “have
little control and no proximity” to the sites they are
trying to change (1997, p. 11). It is hard to claim
that what an SEA did or did not do in relation to
CSR directly was a reason for a change in a school’s
or a state’s student outcomes because so many other
salient variables might have been involved. With
the inconclusive outcomes at Maine’s first cohort of
Promising Futures/CSR high schools noted, an indirect case can be made, nonetheless. Both Maine and
Puerto Rico enabled whole school change processes
to be more broadly and deeply implemented within
their jurisdictions. If CSR implementation can
improve a school, as the thorough research review
by Borman, et al. (2003) suggests, then successful
implementation of whole-school change should be
superior to shallow implementation. Following this
premise, state strategies that enable and sustain
implementation should be credited as enabling and
sustaining improvement.
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